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Abstract 
The main objective of competition law is to promote the process of competition and to ensure that market functions efficiently.. 
However, competition does not always seem to work well in the financial system. This paper attempts to explore issues that may 
arise from the application of competition law in the Malaysian financial sector focusing on various forms of collaboration among 
market players. This paper argues that the cooperations or arrangements need to be assessed on case-by-case basis to see their 
actual effect on competition. In addition, a clear guidance should be formulated to avoid legal uncertainty and unpredictability. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
In Malaysia, the Competition law enforcement is still at its infancy stage and the law that prohibits anti-competitive 
agreement is also relatively new.  The competition law applies to almost all sectors including financial sector. 
However, there are many uncertainties on how the competition law will be implemented in the context of the Malaysia 
financial sector. A quick glance shows that some features of the financial services market may facilitate anti-
competitive behavior. This paper seeks to explore some issues that Malaysian competition authority may encounter in 
the enforcement of competition law in the financial sector.  The paper focuses on the forms of cooperation among 
financial service providers (FSPs) which may have competition concerns. This paper attempts to provide some 
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suggestion on how the competition commission should treat various forms of cooperation under the Competition Act 
2010 (CA 2010).   
Large part of the financial services network favors cooperation rather than competition among market players. 
However, these practices should not be prohibited without taking into consideration the benefits that may be produced 
by the cooperation.  For example, it has been a common practice that financial institutions enter into cooperation to 
share risk over large transaction to ensure that they are able to diversify risk which could not be handled by one 
institution (OECD, Competition and Related Issues in the Insurance Sector, 1998). Studies show that cooperation 
among financial institutions may have pro-competitive effect such as to encourage the introduction of new services 
which cannot be provided unless with the cooperation agreement (OECD, Competition and Related Issues in the 
Insurance Sector, 1998) (Sciences, 2013) (Association, 2013) (Babbel, 1995) (Commission, E. 2013). For example, 
pooling insurance, allows cost savings and reduction in commercial premium (Commission E., 2010). However, the 
competition authority should be mindful of the possibility that this form of cooperation is used as a platform to enforce 
cartel and new services which can be provided without entering into the cooperation in the first place (OECD, 
Competition and Related Issues in the Insurance Sector, 1998). 
The regulation of financial sector is also extended to the formulation of standard terms and conditions. The idea 
behind this is to protect the interest of consumers who are unable to compare various financial products (OECD, 
Competition and Related Issues in the Insurance Sector, 1998). However, standard terms and conditions may facilitate 
price comparison not only by consumer but also by competitors (OECD, Competition and Related Issues in the 
Insurance Sector, 1998). For example, standardization of insurance contract may restrict product variety and 
innovation (OECD, Competition and Related Issues in the Insurance Sector, 1998). It does not allow product 
differentiation and prevent deviation from established standards. It also limits the ability of the consumers to enjoy 
innovative new products (OECD, Competition and Related Issues in the Insurance Sector, 1998).  
Another form of cooperation is information sharing. Information may include sensitive information such as price, 
sales data, business portfolio and strategies. Information sharing such as on loan rates may facilitate collusion and 
support coordinate actions among banking institutions (OECD, Competition and Regulation in Retail Banking, 2006; 
Sufrin, 2010; Bailey, 2011).  However, sharing information is not automatically anti-competitive as it may be pro-
competition and protect the interest of consumer. For example, sharing of information on loss statistics and frequency 
of claims improves knowledge of risks and facilitates the rating of risks for individual companies, thus encourage new 
entrants and benefits consumers (Commission E., 2010). 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1 provides an introduction to the scope and focus of the discussion; 
Section 2 provides an overview of the Competition Act 2010; Section 3 explores various forms of cooperation among 
financial institutions in Malaysia, pro and anti-competitive aspects of these cooperation and the manner in which 
competition law should be applied to these cooperation. Section 4 provides concluding remarks. 
2. Overview of the Competition Act 2010 
The gist of the Competition Act 2010 is section 4 and section 10 of the Act. Section 4 of the CA 2010 prohibits 
horizontal and vertical agreements that have the effect of preventing and distorting competition in the financial market. 
This means, any agreement or arrangement between competitors for the purpose of restricting or preventing 
competition in the market is prohibited. The CA adopts various standards to distinguish the degree of anti-competitive 
behaviour. For example, anti-competitive conduct may be prohibited by object or effect. Under section 4 (2) of the 
CA, anti-competitive behavior such as collusion to fix prices and trading terms and is regarded as hardcore restriction 
and anti-competitive by object without the need on the part of MyCC to prove its actual effect on competition and 
without the need to assess the market power of the parties to the agreement (MyCC, Guidelines on Chapter 1 
Prohibition, 2012). Sharing information on future prices may be deemed to have the object of significantly preventing 
competition (MyCC, Guidelines on Chapter 1 Prohibition, 2012). Other anti-competitive conduct will be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis to see their actual effect on competition. Indeed, sharing non-price information such as technology 
and know-how may even improve competition in the market (MyCC, Guidelines on Chapter 1 Prohibition, 2012).  
 Anti-competitive agreements including those that fall under section 4 (2) may be released from the enforcement 
of the CA 2010 if it fulfils certain criteria under section 5 of the CA 2010. Section 5 lays down 4 requirements that 
need to be fulfilled: a) The agreement produces efficiency, technological and social benefits; b) those benefits cannot 
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be achieved without the anti-competitive agreement; c) the effect of the agreement on competition is proportionate to 
the benefits produced; d) the agreement does not allow total elimination of competition. Efficiency benefits include 
the improvement of the production process, the introduction of new products and new entrants in the market, improved 
quality of products and lower price. The competition authority may also take into consideration whether the benefits 
gained are passed on to the consumers (MyCC, Guidelines on Chapter 1 Prohibition, 2012). The anti-competitive 
agreement needs to pass the indispensability requirements. Price fixing and sharing sensitive information normally 
fail to satisfy the requirement if there are other less restrictive means of producing the efficiency or other benefits 
(MyCC, Block Exemption on Liner Shipping, 2013). The parties to the agreement also need to prove that the effect 
of the agreement on competition will at least be compensated with some other benefits. For example, if an anti-
competitive agreement results in high price, it must be at least compensated with other kind of benefits such as 
improved quality of products or services.  The agreement in question should also reserve some forms of competition. 
For instance, in granting a block exemption on shipping liners, MyCC requires that the agreement shall not contain 
any element of price fixing and disclosure of sensitive information, allow the parties to withdraw from the agreement 
within a reasonable period without being subjected to financial penalty or financial loss for departing from the 
agreement (MyCC, Block Exemption on Liner Shipping, 2013). 
Section 10 of the CA on the other hand prohibits a dominant enterprise from abusing its dominant position. This is 
because a firm with market power is able to adjust prices or output without any effective constraint from competitors 
and consumers, and consumers have no alternative but to deal with the enterprise. Section 10 deals with unilateral 
action by an enterprise and it requires the assessments of market power. Market power can be measured not only by 
assessing market shares of a particular enterprise in the relevant market but also by other factors such as the extent of 
entry barriers in the market (MyCC, Guidelines on Market Definition 2012).  Section 10 (2) lays down a non-
exhaustive list of abusive conduct including the imposition of excessive and predatory pricing, limiting production, 
refusing to supply, bundling and tying etc. The conduct under section 10 can be categorized into two: exploitative 
conduct which is the ability of an enterprise to increase price above the competitive level without effective constraint 
by competitors and consumers and exclusionary conduct which is the ability of an enterprise to exclude equally 
efficient competitors or new competitors from the market (MyCC, Guidelines on Chapter 2 Prohibition, 2012) 
3. Cooperation in the Malaysian financial sector 
3.1. Loan syndication in the banking sector 
 One of the forms of cooperation in banking industry is loan syndication. Loan syndication involves several 
banking institutions that jointly underwrite the funding for high risk and large amount of investment which cannot 
normally be underwritten by an individual banking institution. In this situation, the borrower invites one or few banks 
to arrange and manage the syndication. Upon receiving the proposals, the borrower will choose one or more banks to 
be the arranger for the loan and negotiate a preliminary loan agreement. The arranger will be the responsible party to 
coordinate the negotiation between borrower and the financiers and, to ensure the terms and conditions are agreed 
upon and the amount of financing which is to be raised is sufficient. The arrangers are also responsible to prepare the 
preliminary loan/financing contract that fulfils the specific needs of the borrower (LaRGE, 2007). In facilitating the 
process of loan administration, a bank is normally appointed as the facility agent. The main role of a facility agent is 
to enforce the covenants and to  ensure that  the borrower complies with terms and conditions of the facility.    The 
facility agent may also act a payment agent receiving repayment from or advancing money to the borrower on behalf 
of other financiers, maintaining contact with the borrower, and act as postman or record-keeper (receiving required 
notice from the borrower) (Association, 2013). If the loan is to be secured, a financier may be appointed as a security 
agent to hold security on trust for the benefit of the financiers and to administer the security process such as holding 
the security documents and enforcing the security (Association, 2013).  
 Loan syndication may take various forms and one of  it  is  ‘selling down’ arrangement where one banking 
institution decided to underwrite full amount of financing but later on sells some portions of the financing to the other 
banking institutions. Other forms of loan syndication are ‘club deal’ arrangement  and ‘packaging facilities’ 
arrangement. The former involves several banking institutions that jointly underwrite financing but each banking 
institution has different terms and conditions. However, they share in term of security or collateral for the financing. 
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‘Packaging facilities’ involves several banking institutions offering different facilities to the same borrower for a 
particular project which normally involves material situated outside the country. 
 Loan syndication arrangement may raise issues of competition. There are two important features which may 
facilitate collusion: First, it may involve uniform rate of financing (in the form of profit margin) and terms and 
conditions even though the costs imposed by each bank may be different.  Second, it may also involve information 
sharing between competitors.. Based on a sample of syndicated loan presented to the researcher, the information 
shared by competitors is limited to information on customers and salient terms such as pricing, securities and 
covenants. There is also a clause prohibiting the borrower or facility to misuse the information received which can 
damage the competitive position of the parties. 
 However, there are some pro-competitive effects of loan syndication. For example, it allows banking institutions 
to underwrite high risk financing which cannot be underwritten by a single banking institution. It also provides 
standard term and pricing for customers. Different banking institutions may offer different terms. Some may offer 
loose covenant which result in a high price whereas some may offer strict covenant which may result in a lower price. 
Different terms and prices may result in confusion and unpredictability. Loan syndication may produce efficiency 
benefits. It allows the parties to diversify loan portfolios and income resources through collection of fees and helps to 
exploit comparative advantages of syndicate members in term of financing and information sharing. (LaRGE, 2007), 
The cooperation also creates economies of scale, flexible funding structure and competitive pricing (Allen, 1990) 
(Altunbas, 2006).  
 While it is acknowledged that loan syndication  provides efficiency benefit, the crucial issue is whether the 
agreement passes the indispensability test. The effect of this arrangement should be assessed on case-by-case basis. 
The competition authority should take into consideration whether the agreement is important to cater for large risk 
and whether the benefit cannot be achieved without the agreement; whether the agreement includes unnecessary large 
number of market players and whether there is any less restrictive means of gaining the benefits other than through 
price uniformity. In addition, the competition commission should also be aware of the possibility of sharing 
information and coordinated behavior among financial institutions and to what extent this cooperation will be extended 
to other areas of cooperation. 
3.2. Co-insurance and reinsurance 
In Malaysia, pooling arrangement can be considered to be part of the business strategies of insurance companies 
to cater for business with high risk or uncertain portfolio such as in used motor vehicle businesses and in the energy 
and aviation industry. In 1992,  the Malaysia Motor Insurance Pool (MMIP) was set up  to allow general insurers 
collectively underwrite insurance cover for certain classes of vehicles which are considered “substandard” risk by the 
market (such as express bus, forklift, displaced car or motorcycle etc.) and unable to obtain protection from an 
individual insurer. Insurers may also jointly share the liabilities in the event of losses to MMIP whereby the MMIP 
will act as an insurer of last resort and is allowed to charge a higher premium. Insurer of last resort means the motor 
owner can only buy MMIP insurance after being rejected by at least two insurance companies.  
MMIP is managed by MMIP Services Sdn Bhd on behalf of the general insurance industry. Vehicle owner may 
purchase MMIP cover directly from either of the 2 service insurers, namely, Multipurpose Insurance Bhd or Uni Asia 
General Insurance Bhd. Private vehicle and light good vehicle owners may also purchase MMIP cover from any of 
the post office branch (BNM, Proposed Basic Motor Cover Framework Discussion Paper, 2010). However, MMIP 
will prepare standard policy to be followed by the servicing insurer. Motor insurance is subject to tariff regulation. 
However, insurers may impose additional loadings on top of the tariff based on risk factors. The loadings are capped 
and regulated by the regulator. Insurers cannot impose loadings higher than those permitted by the authority. Almost 
all insurance companies imposed loadings close to maximum cap permitted.   
It is a common practice that insurance companies in Malaysia reinsure part of the risks underwritten by them 
particularly those with high and uncertain portfolio. The application of re-insurance is higher in general insurance than 
life business insurance. Out of seven professional reinsurers in Malaysia, four were registered as general reinsurers, 
one is registerd as life insurer and one for both general and life insurance (General Insurance StudyMode.com, 2013).  
 
 
The term reinsurance means that the reinsurer will purchase the reinsurance business to cater for the reinsurer’s 
need and to cover high risk portfolio. This allows the direct insurers to strongly appear in the market without the 
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insured parties being aware of the reinsurers. The rights and obligations of insurers and reinsurers are governed by a 
reinsurance contract known as ‘reinsurance treaty’. Direct insurers will purchase a reinsurance treaty and the treaty is 
participated by a few reinsurance companies. In this situation, an insurer will provide the information and the 
reinsurance companies may calculate the premiums. It is a normal practice that a reinsurance company becomes a 
leader and other follow the lead without knowing the premium rate bid by the leader. 
Reinsurance business involves two types of arrangements: proportional and non-proportional arrangement. 
Proportional arrangement is an arrangement between insurers and reinsurers to share the premium and the payment 
claim based on the proportion agreed by the direct insurers and reinsurers. Under the proportional reinsurance, the 
direct insurer will cede part of the risk under the same portfolio to the reinsurers at the original conditions agreed 
between the direct insurers and policyholders. Therefore, the reinsurer will involve in the same risks under the same 
conditions as the direct insurers. Non-proportional arrangement is an arrangement between the insurers and reinsurers 
to cover losses above certain percentage. This means that the reinsurers will only be liable upon occurrence of certain 
losses. Unlike the proportional reinsurance, non-proportional reinsurance cover is separate from the original portfolios 
and the terms of original policies.  
Cooperation in the form of pooling arrangement such as the MMIP is very important to cover risk that market has 
less incentive to cover. Without this arrangement, no insurance companies are willing to underwrite high risk portfolio. 
All general insurance companies do not contribute fund to the pool.  Instead, they are required by the regulator to join 
the pool to cover losses and share profits (if any) incurred and earned by the pool. It is likely that this arrangement 
could pass the requirements laid down in section 5 of the CA 2010. Since the MMIP involves participation of all 
general insurers, it may be considered as a dominant entity in the substandard vehicle market. Its behavior (for example 
excessive premium rate may be considered as abusive conduct) may be subject to section 10 of the CA 2010. However, 
since the pool is now generating losses, the MMIP may be considered as Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI) 
thus may be excluded from the CA 2010 under general exclusion, under section 13 of the CA 2010 read together with 
the second schedule. SGEI is a service that must be provided to the public even though market has less incentive to 
provide the service. It is normally entrusted by the government. 
Reinsurance arrangement is more risky. Obviously it involves cooperation among competitors in the form of 
standard terms and conditions bound by direct insurers and reinsurers. Most of the times the premium rates are set by 
the market leader. The competition authority should pay particular attention to certain characteristics of insurance 
arrangement, namely, the purpose of the arrangement, whether the arrangement is important to cater for the large risk; 
and whether reinsurance arrangement is merely a platform for competitors to come together and enforce cartel between 
them especially when the upstream market is concentrated. For example, direct insurers may lobby the market leader 
to enforce a uniform premium and policy conditions. 
3.3. Standard terms and conditions 
Cooperation in the financial sector may also involve an arrangement to have standard terms and conditions. In 
insurance sector, fire and motor insurance business are regulated by tariff. This price fixing is sanctioned by the 
regulator and embodied in trade association’s rules and regulations. All insurance policies covering motor and fire 
risks in Malaysia issued, accepted and endorsed by members of General Insurance Association of Malaysia shall be 
applied at least the minimum rates stipulated in the Malaysian Motor or Fire Tariff.  However, additional loading may 
be imposed on tariff for high risk portfolio business. The maximum loadings are also capped by the regulator.  Other 
than tariff, trade association rules also provide standard and simplified wordings for the policy, standard scale of 
discounts, surcharges on special hazards associated with each class of risk, discounts for various improvements on the 
risk, wordings for the standard policy forms, endorsements and warranties; general rules and regulations governing 
the conduct of motor insurance business in Malaysia. For example Clause 5.3 Inter-Company Agreement of General 
Business Insurance reads:  
 
“No Member, Agent or Broker shall give to any insured or policyholder any discount or rebate whatsoever on any 
commission paid or payable or on any part or parts thereof, in respect of any insurance policy covering a motor 
risk rated under the Malaysian Motor Tariff.”  
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Another example of standard terms is the rule which prohibits floating insurance covering material damage of 
property situated at more than one location under a single sum insured unless the insured stock are specified as a 
separate item in the policy schedule and all the locations concerned must be specifically described in the policy 
(General Rules for the Regulation of Fire Insurance Business in Malaysia). The association rules also provides for the 
maximum amount of commission to agent, underwriting agents and brokers (General Rules for the Regulation of Fire 
Insurance Business in Malaysia; BNM, Guidelines to Control Operating Costs of Life Insurance Business, 2012). In 
life insurance for example, standardized term is found in the definition of critical illness. There are 36 critical illnesses 
covered under the definition. The reason for the standardization is to provide consistency in interpretation and to avoid 
ambiguity in the market if only some insurers cover certain type of illnesses whilst some insurers do not.  Another 
example is standardized amount of gift that can be offered to the policyholder. This is to ensure that policyholders are 
paying more attention to the insurance itself than on the gift. 
Some standard terms and conditions such as tariffs reflect the regulator’s directives. These uniform practices will 
be excluded from the competition law enforcement for complying with legislative requirements under Section 13 and 
Second Schedule of the Competition Act 2010. Standard terms and conditions may have pro-competitive effect. For 
example, it facilitates comparison of various products and services by consumers. From a producer’s perspective, 
standard terms improve processing process (BNM, Prohibited Business Conduct (Concept Paper), 2014) and prevent 
unhealthy undercutting by insurers (BNM, The Financial Sector Master Plan, 2001). Therefore, standard terms should 
not be prohibited by object but rather needs full analysis of the effect of these practices on market competition. The 
competition authority should be mindful of the use of price ceiling or price cap as a means to enforce cartel even 
without an explicit agreement. For example, in the case of additional loading on top of tariff, many firms apply the 
same rate close to maximum cap imposed by the regulator. Though this practice may be in compliance with regulation, 
the possibility that arises from tacit collusion without any justification cannot be ruled out. Non-price standard terms 
should also be assessed on case-by-case basis. Some terms merely relate to standard wordings while some have 
insignificant effect on competition (such as standard gifts). However, some terms may be formulated merely to limit 
outputs, prevent innovation and restrict consumer choices. 
 
3.4. Information sharing 
 
In Malaysia, trade associations become important for collecting and disseminating information among members. 
Trade associations do not disseminate sensitive information such as future price between members. However, they do 
share other non-price information such as information on an agent that has been blacklisted by an insurer (such as 
involving in cheating and misappropriation of money) to avoid other insurers from engaging with the same agent and 
save consumers from a bad agent.  
The Malaysia insurers also cooperate with each other by sharing statistical information.  For example, Insurance 
Service Malaysia (ISM) was established as Malaysia Rating Organization department in General Insurance 
Association of Malaysia. One of the objectives of ISM is to build up a statistics database for the insurance industry. 
Among its strategic objectives is to provide online access to insurance industry information and increase the utilization 
of information in insurance operation. ISM provides statistical information such as average cost of claims, frequency 
of claims, claim patterns or factors that lead to occurrence of claims etc. The shared information assists the industry 
in making better underwriting decision and improving portfolio management, reviewing the claim history of an 
individual on an industry-wide basis and identifying potentially fraudulent claim (Net, 2014) Sharing statistical 
information should not be prohibited by object. The competition authority should assess to what extent that sharing 
statistical information may facilitate collusion among members. Sharing statistical information may provide the 
opportunity for competitors to anticipate the business strategy and portfolio of the others. The collaboration should 
only be exempted to the extent that it is necessary for the calculation of average cost of covering a specified risk in 
the past. Information should not allow the identification of the individual insurer, should not contain indication of the 
level of commercial premiums and other unnecessary information such as administrative and commercial costs.  
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4. Concluding remarks 
This paper does not offer detailed evidence of the anti-competitive behavior in the financial services market but 
provides some features of the financial market that may facilitate anti-competitive behavior for future enforcement of 
the Malaysian Competition Act 2010. From the study conducted, the researcher found that some practices may provide 
space for market players to coordinate their behavior in the market.  A detailed study should be carried out to determine 
the extent to which these practices restrict competition. The pro and anti-competitive effect of these practices should 
be weighed. The competition authority should take into consideration the following questions: 1. Whether the existing 
collaboration needs to cater for high risk which cannot be undertaken by individual market players or merely as means 
to enforce cartel among them; 2. To what extent the collaboration involves price fixing or information sharing which 
may facilitate collusion; 3. What kind of information that involved in the collaboration and to what extent it can be 
used to coordinate behavior in other areas of cooperation; 4. To what extent these practices benefit consumers.   It is 
suggested that a clear guidelines in the form of a block exemption should be formulated to provide legal certainty in 
the market. The guidelines should clearly lay down conditions that need to be fulfilled to exempt these practices and 
to ensure that these practices are not used in anti-competitive manners. 
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